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Access to appropriate, quality education is crucial to human well-
being. Education improves basic life prospects as well as more complex
aspects of well-being. A literate and numerate person is better able to
read a bus schedule, to make informed choices about nutrition, to
understand warnings on hazardous household products, or to complete
a job application. An educated person is better able to articulate her
needs in public discussions, to comprehend the implications of his
voting choices, or to participate meaningfully in a deliberative democ-
racy.
At present, in the United States and elsewhere in the world, women
are legally, socially and economically disadvantaged relative to men.
In the United States, this disadvantage is rooted in historical and
systemic discrimination against women, because they are women, i.e.,
because of sex. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the Supreme
Court in United States v. Virginia,' recently framed the contribution
that equal protection jurisprudence makes to dismantling this sex ine-
quality: courts must invalidate sex-based classifications that "create or
perpetuate the legal, social and economic inferiority of women."'
According to the Court, sex-based classifications are, however, some-
times permissible. They are permissible to compensate women for
particular economic disabilities women have suffered 3 and to promote
equal employment opportunity. 4 Importantly, for the educational con-
text, sex-based classifications are permissible "to advance full devel-
opment of the talents and capacities of our Nation's people."'
* Lecturer, University of Washington School of Law; J.D., 1990, University of
Chicago; B.A., 1987, University of Notre Dame.
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1. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) [hereinafter VMI].
2. Id. at 2276.
3. Id. (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320, 97 S. Ct. 1192, 1196 (1977)
(per curiam)).
4. Id. (citing California Fed. Say. & Loan v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289, 107 S. Ct.
683, 694 (1987)).
5. Id.
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The Supreme Court has twice considered questions of educational
equality in the context of single-sex higher education, most recently in
United States v. Virginia, the Virginia Military Institute case. Applying
what appears to have become a standard inquiry in Equal Protection
Clause cases involving sex-based classifications, the Court in both cases
invalidated single-sex admissions policies - policies that in one case
excluded men and in the other excluded women. Yet in each case, the
Court was careful to leave open the possibility that single-sex higher
education, which necessarily entails a sex-based classification, is in
some cases constitutional. However, the Court's guidance on what those
cases might be is less than clear. Educators and policymakers under-
standably may have difficulty predicting the Court's response to some
potentially effective educational arrangements.
These cases, moreover, reveal an equal protection inquiry ill-equipped
to do all of the work that it has to do in the educational context. Part
of the problem, in my view, is the Court's seeming preoccupation with
the legislative motives behind measures that have "compensatory"
features. This orientation requires the Court to be suspicious even of
those measures that address the unequal social and economic position
of women that is the result of systemic sex discrimination. It requires
the Court to seek out sex-based classifications that appear to have been
enacted in connection with traditional or stereotypical ways of thinking
about women; such measures are then invalidated, irrespective of their
contribution to eroding sex inequalities in social and economic position.
Although improper legislative inputs deserve the Court's attention,
some equal protection problems, including those posed by single-sex
education, present concerns unaddressed by a focus on legislative
inputs. In particular, the Court's inquiry may be incompletely concep-
tualized to scrutinize measures that have more complex implications
for sex equality in the short- and long-terms - a problem brought to
the fore by the Court's inquiry regarding the all-female school of nursing
at issue in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.'
Given the intrinsic and instrumental value of education for well-
being, we might usefully turn to philosophers, economists and poli-
cymakers whose work in the field of human development has pushed
them to articulate a more nuanced conception of human well-being
than the one employed by the modern Court. Recent efforts to assess
countries' development in terms of quality of life and human capabil-
ities seem especially useful. Such frameworks provide a basis for
assessing aggregate well-being and for identifying inequalities in well-
being. Importantly, they provide a basis for identifying inequalities
along gender lines.
A capability approach might help a court to decide when, in partic-
ular cases, there is an "exceedingly persuasive justification", for a
6. 458 U.S. 718, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
7. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2274; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724, 102 S. Ct. at 3336; Kirchberg
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classification based on sex in the form of a publicly-funded single-sex
school. It would focus inquiry through the lens of education's role in
enhancing human capabilities, as that term is used by Amartya Sen to
mean the alternative combinations of things that a person can do or be
in leading his or her life.8 It could improve the Court's equal protection
inquiry by providing a common, concrete metric for evaluating the
diverse benefits of particular single-sex educational offerings, an eval-
uative tool that is substantively more useful and complete than a focus
primarily on legislative inputs.
Part I of this essay discusses the Court's work in Mississippi Univer-
sity for Women v. Hogan and United States v. Virginia, the cases in
which it has addressed the constitutionality of single-sex higher edu-
cation. This part argues that the Court's equal protection inquiry in-
completely serves the questions presented in an educational context. It
begins by noting the Court's struggle to articulate a coherent means-
ends test in these two cases. It questions the adequacy of an inquiry
focused primarily on ferreting out inaccurate legislative stereotyping,
where the measures at issue work in complex ways, at once addressing
and perpetuating the systemic social and economic deprivation of one
sex. It suggests that an overemphasized concern for legislative inputs
might explain the underdeveloped state of the remainder of the Court's
inquiry. This part then returns to Hogan, which presents just such a
measure and introduces the special context of higher education. It
argues that to evaluate questions of sex equality in higher education,
the Court has more work to do than an inquiry trained on inaccurate
legislative stereotypes equips it to do.
Part II describes a tool for evaluating equality that fills out the
underdeveloped aspects of the Court's current inquiry, namely, a ca-
pability approach. This part sketches Amartya Sen's formulation of a
capability approach, which assesses well-being and identifies individual
advantage by reference to an account of a person's capabilities, that is,
what a person is able to do or be. This part depicts the current gender
gap in capabilities that exists in every country in the world today. It
notes education's important role in enhancing human capabilities.
In Part III, this essay suggests that a capability approach of the sort
outlined in Part II would fill out and give clarity to the Court's inquiry
v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461, 101 S. Ct. 1195, 1199 (1981); Personnel Adm'r of Mass.
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2293 (1979).
8. Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALIrr OF LIFE 30 (Martha
Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993) [hereinafter Capability]; see also Amartya Sen,
Equality of What? in CHOtCE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 353 (Amartya Sen ed., 1982)
[hereinafter Equality]; Amartya Sen, Gender and Cooperative Conflicts, in PERSISTENT
INEQUALTIES: WOMEN & WORLD DEVELOPMENT 123 (Irene Tinker ed., 1990) [hereinafter
Gender]. A person's capabilities refer to his or her capacity or opportunity to choose
valuable activities or to achieve valued states, e.g., to be well nourished, to obtain
medical care, to be sheltered, to obtain education, to participate meaningfully in public
life, to be able to avoid physical violence, and the like.
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in cases of single-sex higher education. This part outlines the advan-
tages of a capability approach in this context and offers a tentative
framework for assessing educational arrangements that include a single-
sex offering. This essay concludes that a capability approach holds
promise for doing some real work in these cases by providing a concrete,
substantive metric for appraisal.
I. SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION
In his dissent in United States v. Virginia, Justice Scalia claimed that
the majority had tolled the death knell for publicly-funded single-sex
education., This claim seems overstated in light of the majority's efforts
to the contrary. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, took pains to
rule narrowly, to extol the benefits of single-sex education, to affirm
the state's prerogative "evenhandedly" to support diverse educational
opportunities, and to state that sex-based classifications may appropri-
ately be used "to advance full development of the talent and capacities
of our Nation's people." 10 The Court does not, however, make any clear
statement about permissible single-sex educational arrangements. Thus,
despite the Court's assurance, the concern remains: in which cases is
single-sex education appropriate?
A. United States v. Virginia and Mississippi University for Women
v. Hogan
The Supreme Court's decision last Term in United States v. Virginia,
together with its decision fourteen years prior, in Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan, provide the analytic framework for assessing
whether single-sex higher education is constitutional. In these cases,
the Court stated that "the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies
individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of
showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classifica-
tion." 1 Whether the shorthand "exceedingly persuasive justification"
was meant to strengthen the foundation for an invigorated sort of
"intermediate scrutiny" in the future, the Court in both cases appeared
to use the ordinary version.12 That is, under intermediate scrutiny, a
measure will be found unconstitutional unless the state objectives
served are "important" and the means chosen to meet the objectives
9. 116 S. Ct. at 2308 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Hogan, 458 U.S. at 734, 102
S. Ct. at 3341 (Blackmun J., dissenting) (portending "spillover" from the Court's decision
placing in jeopardy any single-sex state-supported educational institution, despite the
Court's express claim to be writing narrowly, addressing only the Mississippi University
for Women's School of Nursing).
10. 116 S. Ct. at 2276-77 nn.7-8 and accompanying text.
11. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724, 102 S. Ct. at 3336 (citing Kirchberg, 450 U.S. 455, 101
S. Ct. 1195 (1981); Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979)); accord VMI, 116 S. Ct.
at 2274.
12. Cf. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2294-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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are "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."" The
Court declined the opportunity to invoke the highest level of review
under the Equal Protection Clause, "strict scrutiny," which is currently
reserved for classifications based on race or national origin, and for
fundamental rights.14 Notably, the Court stated in Hogan that a policy
that "discriminates against males rather than against females" is not
exempted from scrutiny, and that the standard of review is not reduced
in these cases."5
Elaborating the intermediate level of judicial inquiry, the Court in
both cases (although in response to different concerns) looked behind
the proffered justification to assess its grounding in the facts. In United
States v. Virginia, the Court was concerned that the Commonwealth of
Virginia had manufactured its asserted interest in providing diverse
educational offerings within the state. The Court there insisted that the
justification offered "must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented
post hoc in response to litigation."' 16 In Hogan, the Court sought to
ensure that Mississippi's effort to "compensate[] for discrimination
against women"" was in fact warranted by an actual disadvantage in
the area addressed by the classification. "It is readily apparent that a
State can evoke a compensatory purpose to justify an otherwise dis-
criminatory classification only if members of the gender benefited by
the classification actually suffer a disadvantage related to the classifi-
cation." 18 Importantly, in neither case did the Court doubt the benefits
of single-sex higher education for some students, men and women
alike. 19
13. Id. at 2275; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724, 102 S. Ct. at 3335.
14. In each case, however, the Court made oblique reference to the fact that the
application of "strict scrutiny" might still be an open question for gender-based classi-
fications. In Hogan, the Court included a qualifying footnote: "Because we conclude that
the challenged statutory classification is not substantially related to an important objective,
we need not decide whether classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect."
458 U.S. at 724, 102 S. Ct. at 3335 n.9. In VMI, the Court arrived at the intermediate
scrutiny standard through the back door: "Without equating gender classifications, for
all purposes, to classifications based on race or national origin, . . . the reviewing court
must determine whether the proffered justification is 'exceedingly persuasive,"' and
emphasized the unsettled nature of the terrain in a footnote: "The Court has thus far
reserved most stringent judicial scrutiny for classifications based on race or national
origin, but last Term observed that strict scrutiny of such classifications is not inevitably
'fatal in fact."' 116 S. Ct. at 2275 & n.6 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115
S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995)). Justice Scalia, in dissent, took the majority to task for what
he called "irresponsible . . . Supreme.Court peek-a-boo." Id. at 2295.
15. 458 U.S. at 723, 102 S. Ct. at 3335-36; cf. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); see
also David A. Strauss, Affirmnative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 SuP. CT. REv. 1.
16. 116 S..Ct. at 2275.
17. 458 U.S. at 727, 102 S. Ct. at 3337.
18. Id. at 727-28, 102 S. Ct. at 3338.
19. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2276-77 & nn.7-8; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720-21, 102 S. Ct. at
3330.
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Hogan involved the female-only admissions policy of the Mississippi
University for Women's ("MUW") School of Nursing. 20 MUW offers a
baccalaureate nursing program at its campus in Columbus, Mississippi.
In 1979, Joe Hogan applied to the School of Nursing's baccalaureate
program but was denied admission because he was male. Explicitly
limiting its holding to the School of Nursing, the Court found its
admissions policy invalid. The Court's result rested primarily on its
conclusion that the sex-based classification maintained by the School
of Nursing did not address actual barriers faced by women. "Mississippi
has made no showing that women lacked opportunities to obtain train-
ing in the field of nursing or to attain positions of leadership in that
field when the MUW School of Nursing opened its door or that women
currently are deprived of such opportunities. ' ' 21 In fact, according to
data before the Court, women earned 94% of the baccalaureate nursing
degrees in Mississippi in 1970 (the year before MUW opened its nursing
school), comprised 98.6% of the baccalaureate nursing degrees con-
ferred nationwide, and accounted for almost 98% of all employed
registered nurses; in 1980 (just prior to the Court's decision), women
received more than 9 4 % of baccalaureate nursing degrees nationwide
and constituted 96.5% of the registered nurses in the labor force.22 The
Court was concerned that far from compensating for barriers faced by
women as a result of discrimination, the School of Nursing's policy
might instead perpetuate the stereotype that nursing is exclusively a
woman's job. The Court cited evidence that this exclusivity contributed
to depressed nurses' wages.23 Thus, the Court concluded, "although
the State recited a 'benign, compensatory purpose,' it failed to establish
that the alleged objective is the actual purpose underlying the discrim-
inatory classification." '2 4 The Court noted secondarily that Mississippi
had failed to demonstrate that the means it had selected, i.e., providing
single-sex education for women in a baccalaureate nursing program,
was substantially and directly related to its compensatory objective.
Because the School of Nursing permitted men to audit classes, and
because the Court had no evidence from nursing schools that teaching
style, women's performance, or women's participation is affected by
the presence of men in the classroom, the Court reasoned that MUW's
admissions policy excluding men could not actually be necessary to
reach its educational goals.
2 5
20. MUW is the only single-sex public college or university maintained by Mississippi.
458 U.S. at 720, 102 S. Ct. at 3334 n.1. Mississippi's seven public coeducational
universities include two baccalaureate nursing programs. Id. at 735, 102 S. Ct. at 3331
(Powell, J., dissenting).
21. 458 U.S. at 729, 102 S. Ct. at 3339.
22. Id. at 729, 102 S. Ct. at 3339 & n.14.
23. Id. at 730, 102 S. Ct. at 3340 n.15.
24. Id. at 730, 102 S. Ct. at 3339.
25. Id. at 730-31, 102 S. Ct. at 3339-40.
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In United States v. Virginia, 26 the Court faced a challenge by the
United States to Virginia's maintenance of an "incomparable military
college," the Virginia Military Institute ("VMI"), as a single-sex school
for men.27 VMI is noted for its use of a unique pedagogical method,
"the adversative method." Established in 1839, VMI has a long tradition
of producing leaders. A VMI diploma is prestigious and connects
graduates to a network of well-positioned alumni throughout the nation.
Focusing the first part of its equal protection inquiry on whether
Virginia's justification was genuine, the Court found that "[n]either
recent nor distant history bears out Virginia's alleged pursuit of diver-
sity through single-sex educational options."28 The Court recounted
Virginia's history of bitter opposition to providing educational oppor-
tunities for women at all, followed by its begrudging establishment of
schools for women "far from equal in resources and stature to schools
for men," and, finally, only in 1972, its admission of women on an
equal basis with men to "'the most prestigious institution of higher
education in Virginia,' the University of Virginia. '"29 The Court con-
cluded that "[a] purpose genuinely to advance an array of educational
options ... is not served by VMI's historic and constant plan - a plan
to 'affor[d] a unique educational benefit only to males.' However 'lib-
erally' this plan serves the State's sons, it makes no provision whatever
for her daughters. ' 3° The Court next examined Virginia's claim that
the unique educational benefits provided by the VMI method "cannot
be made available, unmodified, to women." ' 31 The Court rejected this
claim on factual grounds, pointing out that this argument depended on
just the sort of overbroad generalizations and 'fixed notions concerning
the roles and abilities of males and females' that are likely to close
the "gates to opportunity" and "perpetuate historical patterns of dis-
crimination. "32 Having found an unconstitutional exclusion on the basis
of sex, the Court turned its attention to the remedy fashioned by Virginia
and challenged in the second phase of the litigation: Virginia created
the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership ("VWIL") as a single-
sex college for women, while maintaining VMI as a single-sex college
for men. The Court readily concluded that VWIL could not be said
meaningfully to be VMI's equal.33
26. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
27. VMI is the only single-sex public institution of higher learning provided by
Virginia; the Commonwealth also provides fourteen coeducational public colleges and
universities. Id. at 2269.
28. Id. at 2277.
29. Id. at 2277-78.
30. Id. at 2279 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2280 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725,
102 S. Ct. 3331; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rei. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139, 114 S. Ct. 1419,
1427 n.11).
33. Id. at 2282-86.
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The Court in each of these two cases invalidated single-sex admissions
policies, in one case excluding men and in the other excluding women.
Both Hogan and United States v. Virginia, however, took care to
emphasize that sex-based classifications favoring one sex may be jus-
tifiable in some circumstances. According to the Court in United States
v. Virginia, "[s]ex classifications may be used to compensate women
'for particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,' [or] to ad-
vance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's
people."3 4 In Hogan, the Court explained that such a classification can
be justified "if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex
that is disproportionately burdened.''35 By way of example, the Hogan
Court cited Califano v. Webster,36 in which the Court upheld a statute
that allowed women to eliminate more low-earning years than men for
purposes of computing social security retirement benefits, noting that
the statute "took into account that women 'as such have been unfairly
hindered from earning as much as men' and 'work[ed] directly to
remedy' the resulting economic disparity."
' 3 7
But how do Hogan and United States v. Virginia, taken together,
answer the question under which circumstances single-gender educa-
tion is a permissible objective of government? The Court could have
been more clear. Courts, policymakers and educators are understandably
uncertain about the Court's guidance.
B. The Equal Protection Inquiry in the Context of Higher Education
When is a government justified in maintaining a single-sex higher
educational option for one sex and not the other? When is it justified
in offering paired single-sex higher educational opportunities, one each
for men and for women? Hogan and United States v. Virginia together
provide a starting point. Several problems surface, however, upon trying
to imagine a court's response to some potentially useful educational
arrangements. For those hoping to toe the Court's line in the future,
the guidance that emerges from these cases is unclear, and may be
incompletely conceptualized to do all of the work that it has to do in
the educational context.
In neither Hogan nor United States v. Virginia was the Court satisfied
with the interest advanced by the state in defense of the single-sex
admissions policy. And in both cases (although for different reasons)
the Court was unimpressed with some aspect of the means-ends fit.
The result of the Court's equal protection inquiry in United States v.
Virginia is not surprising, given the one-sided bent of Virginia's higher
34. 116 S. Ct. at 2276 (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320, 97 S. Ct. 1192,
1196 (1977) (per curiam)) (second alteration in original).
35. 458 U.S. at 728, 102 S. Ct. at 3338.
36. 430 U.S. 313, 97 S. Ct. 1192 (1977).
37. 458 U.S. at 728, 102 S. Ct. at 3338 (citing Califano, 430 U.S. at 318, 97 S. Ct.
at 1195).
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education offerings and the fact that the excluded sex was female, the
sex bearing the social and economic costs of sex discrimination. Yet
the Court gave less clear guidance than it might have in such an "easy"
case, because it entertained seriously a state objective that begs the
question: Virginia's claimed interest in diversity of educational choices.
The dissent similarly offers little help. Justice Scalia supplied Virginia
with an alternative objective: providing effective college education for
its citizens. But the resulting means-ends inquiry does no work, if we
accept available empirical data that single-sex higher education is in
fact effective for both men and women.38 The result in Hogan is perhaps
more surprising, but the Court's approach does some useful work
toward eliminating measures that perpetuate limited possibilities for
women's roles and opportunities. However, it needs to be more fully
conceptualized if it is to provide adequate guidance for the context of
single-sex higher education.
These cases help reveal an underlying limitation in current equal
protection jurisprudence: its focus on inaccurate legislative stereotyp-
ing. The primacy of this concern has resulted in an inquiry well-trained
to address just one part of the problem for sex equality, but underde-
veloped for its work with other parts of this problem. An inquiry
designed chiefly to identify inaccurate legislative stereotyping is not
sufficiently nuanced to handle the complex ways in which various
measures may discriminate against women. It is not sufficiently nu-
anced to handle measures that may at once work to eradicate and to
perpetuate the systemic social and economic deprivation of women.
And, as Hogan illustrates, these inadequacies are a particular liability
for the Court's attempt to address the problem of sex equality in the
context of higher education.
1. A Coherent Means-Ends Test
As a preliminary matter, it is worth marking the Court's difficulty
framing a coherent means-ends inquiry in cases examining single-sex
higher education. The Court's struggle here may evidence more than a
superficial quibble. Instead, there is likely real disagreement over what
the problem is, that is, the wrong of sex discrimination. When the
Court strains in this way to articulate a useful test, we might want to
examine more carefully the adequacy of the inquiry for its task.
Between the majority and the dissent in United States v. Virginia,
the Court entertains two formulations of the means-ends inquiry, neither
of which amounts to a useful test. The first of these formulations suffers
38. The United States did not contest the district court's finding that empirical data
supported the claim that "both men and women can benefit from a single-sex education."
The Court accepted the district court's findings, although it noted the district court's
further statement that the beneficial effects of single-sex education are "stronger among
women than among men." VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2276-77 & n.8. For additional empirical
data regarding the benefits of single-sex education for each sex, see infra note 73.
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because it is not falsifiable. Where the question is whether it is consti-
tutional for the state to provide single-sex educational opportunities to
one sex but not the other, the objective advanced by the state cannot
be diversity of educational choices. Although this objective was sug-
gested by Justice Powell in his dissent in Hogan, advanced by Virginia
in United States v. Virginia, and championed by Justice Scalia in his
dissent in that case, it requires an argument that begs the question.
Any sex-based classification that provides a single-sex educational op-
portunity to one sex is going to increase the diversity of educational
choices available for that sex - the benefited sex. The Court in Hogan
recognized as much in response to Justice Powell's suggestion that
Mississippi's objective was to provide women a choice of educational
environments:
Since any gender-based classification provides one class a benefit
or choice not available to the other class, however, [Justice Pow-
ell's] argument begs the question. The issue is not whether the
benefited class profits from the classification, but whether the
State's decision to confer a benefit only upon one class by means
of a discriminatory classification is substantially related to achiev-
ing a legitimate and substantial goal.
3 9
The test rules out nothing. David Strauss explains the work that this
aspect of the Court's inquiry must do in the context of affirmative
action and strict scrutiny: "The government interests needn't be com-
pelling, in the sense of especially important, but they must be confining:
the claim that a measure promotes that particular government interest
must be falsifiable.-40 On this view, the Hogan Court ruled out the
option of claiming an interest in "diversity of educational choices" not
because this interest would not be sufficiently "important," but because
it could be used to justify any single-sex school.
Interestingly, Virginia disregarded this exchange in Hogan and claimed
that VMI was established and maintained "with a view to diversifying
... educational opportunities within the State." 41 The Court entertained
Virginia's proffered justification as if it did not beg the question, urging
only that "a tenable justification must describe actual state purposes,
not rationalizations for actions in fact differently grounded.' '42 It rejected
Virginia's argument not because it was not sufficiently important -
indeed the Court conceded "it is not disputed that diversity among
public educational institutions can serve the public good." ' 43 Instead,
it rejected Virginia's argument because the Court found that Virginia's
39. 458 U.S. at 731, 102 S. Ct. at 3340 n.17.
40. Strauss, supra note 15, at 28.
41. 116 S. Ct. at 2277.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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proffered interest in diversity was not and never had been its actual
interest; rather, it was a post hoc justification adopted for litigation.
However, the Court muddied the waters by proceeding as if the opposite
answer would do any work toward resolving the equal protection
question. United States v. Virginia thus gives the misimpression that
a state might usefully justify providing single-sex education to one sex
by reference to an interest in providing a "diversity in educational
opportunities ' 44 to the benefited sex. Instead, we are at square one,
with an equal protection question before us.
The second formulation fails to provide a means-ends test that re-
solves the distributive aspect of the equal protection problem. Dissent-
ing in United States v. Virginia, Justice Scalia supplied Virginia with
an alternative interest: "providing effective college education for its
citizens." ' 45 The importance of this interest, he asserted, "is beyond
question. '46 He continued, "That single-sex instruction is an approach
substantially related to that interest should be evident enough"47 from
both the long history in this country of single-sex education, and the
lower courts' factual finding that single-sex education at the college
level is beneficial to both sexes.48 Under Justice Scalia's formulation,
there is again no real test, but the infirmity is of a different sort. If
Virginia's interest is in providing effective college education for its
citizens, and if single-sex education has been demonstrated, as a factual
matter, to be a good way to achieve the goal of effective college
education for both sexes, then when is it okay for Virginia to provide
such education to one sex (at VMI, males) and not the other (at VMI,
females)? If we accept current empirical data on the benefits of single-
sex colleges for at least some males and some females, Justice Scalia's
test sets up - but supplies no apparatus to answer - the familiar,
basic equal protection query: whether it is okay to give a benefit
exclusively to one sex, because of sex. Thus, Justice Scalia's proposed
inquiry and response provide little more guidance to educators and
policymakers than that of the majority.
2. Adequacy of the Inquiry
In Hogan, Mississippi asserted a compensatory interest in providing
to women a single-sex educational opportunity in the form of a nursing
44. Id. at 2276 n.7.
45. Id. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. Note that Justice Scalia mentioned only this first part of the lower courts'
findings on the benefits of single-sex college education; he did not mention a related
part of the lower courts' findings, that the benefits of single-sex college education "are
stronger among women than among men," and that there is currently greater demand
for single-sex higher education among women than among men. The majority, however,
noted the greater benefits of single-sex education for women. See 116 S. Ct. at 2277 n.8
(citing United States v. Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1414 (W.D. Va.
1991)).
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school. The Court undertook an inquiry typical of cases in which the
state's claimed objective is to compensate for past discrimination: it
asked whether the benign, compensatory purpose cited was the actual
purpose animating the measure under scrutiny. While an inquiry into
the actual purposes of a measure or policy may be an important check
on the interests asserted in many sex discrimination cases, this focus
is misplaced in the context of education, as the result in Hogan helps
illustrate. Here my claim is that the Court focused its inquiry in a way
that incompletely (and therefore, dis-)serves questions in the educa-
tional context, i.e., in a way that does not fully get at the problems for
sex equality posed by single-sex educational arrangements. This claim
requires a bit of background in the development of equal protection
doctrine for gender-based classifications.
a. Development of Equal Protection Doctrine for Sex-Based
Classifications
Equal protection doctrine for classifications based on sex has grown
up on a sampling of equality concerns. 4 9 In some (but not all) cases
the trick has been to "smoke out" situations where women are the
apparent intended beneficiaries of a measure, but where scrutiny reveals
the measure instead to be a product of either intentional or accidental
legislative stereotyping of women's roles and abilities. The equal pro-
tection inquiry that has evolved bears the marks of its development in
these cases in particular; it may, in fact, be overly focused on this
aspect of its task, while not completely conceptualized for the remainder
of its work.
Commentators have observed the Court's preoccupation with imper-
missible "legislative inputs," even in cases where the measure in
question ostensibly benefited women. 50 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld 5' is
49. For a discussion of the strategic and practical considerations at play in selecting
and framing the issues before the Court, and the effects of the litigants' decisions,
compare Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsberg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist
Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9; and Deborah L. Markowitz, In
Pursuit of Equality: One Woman's Work to Change the Law, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
335 (1992); with Mary Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT. REV.
201.
50. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modem Equal Protection,
90 MICH. L. REv. 213, 303-08 (1991) (attributing focus on impermissible legislative inputs
to the Burger Court's inclination toward a process-oriented understanding of equal
protection); cf. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law:
The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9-14, 26-31 (1995)
(explaining origins of Court's focus on distinguishing inaccurate or stereotypical differ-
ences from "real" differences as Court's conception of sex as immutable, of male and
female as two different kinds of beings; "We have inherited a jurisprudence of sexual
equality that seeks to distinguish, as its primary function, inaccurate myths about sexual
identity from true - and therefore pre-political - characteristics of sex that are factually
significant.").
51. 420 U.S. 636, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
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considered to be the first such case,5 2 and is the genesis of the oft-
quoted directive to look to the actual purposes animating a measure
that appears to benefit women: "the mere recitation of a benign,
compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against
any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme."
5 3
In Weinberger, the Court invalidated a Social Security Act provision
that entitled widows, but not widowers, to survivor's benefits. The
government attempted to characterize the measure as one "designed to
compensate women beneficiaries as a group for the economic difficulties
which still confront women who seek to support themselves and their
families, '54 thereby bringing the statute within the reach of Kahn v.
Shevin5 5 and Schlesinger v. Ballard.56 When the Court looked to the
statutory scheme and the legislative history, however, it found no
evidence of compensatory intent "premised upon any special disad-
vantages of women." 57 It surmised instead that the measure "was
intended to permit women beneficiaries to elect not to work and to
devote themselves to the care of the children.'- 8 Although later courts
often cast Weinberger and similar cases 59 as striking down measures
that apparently discriminated in favor of women, given revealed ster-
eotypical, paternalistic legislative purposes or presumptions, the Court's
view of the facts in Weinberger is important to understanding the
inquiry that developed. Before turning to address the government's
argument, the Court in the first part of its analysis characterized the
question before it as whether the measure improperly discriminated
against women wage earners, whose widowers could not benefit from
social security taxes paid by their wives. The widows of male wage
earners, by contrast, could benefit fully from social security taxes paid
by their husbands. The Constitution, concluded the Court, "forbids the
gender-based differentiation that results in the efforts of female workers
52. Rlarman, supra note 50, at 306.
53. Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 648, 95 S. Ct. at 1233.
54. Id.
55. 416 U.S. 351, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974) (In upholding Florida tax preference for
widows but not widowers, the Court acknowledged that financial difficulties confronting
the widowed woman exceeded those confronting the widowered man. The Court ventured
that women's unequal social and economic position in this regard might be "from overt
discrimination or from the socialization process of a male-dominated culture.").
56. 419 U.S. 498, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975) (In upholding the Navy's promotion system
permitting women longer tenure than men before mandatory dismissal for'nonpromotion,
the Court recognized differential treatment as rational response to men's and women's
different opportunities for satisfying the qualifications for promotion.).
57. Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 648, 95 S. Ct. at 1233.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 97 S. Ct. 1021 (1977) (striking down
Social Security Act provision automatically granting survivors' benefits to widows but
requiring widowers to prove dependency, the Court emphasized that the provision clearly
deprived women workers of the protection for their families that men workers automat-
ically received).
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required to pay social security taxes producing less protection for their
families than is produced by the efforts of men.''60 Thus, the statute
that the Court struck down benefited some women, but it clearly
disadvantaged other women.
Later to portray the measures involved in Weinberger and similar
cases as having wholly "benign, compensatory" purposes, about which
the Court must nonetheless be suspicious, is to mislead.61 The Court
in this case needed to be and was suspicious, first, because the measure
disadvantaged women - here, women wage earners.
b. Sex Inequality and the Complexities of Deprivation
An overzealous focus on ferreting out measures that are the product of
intentional or accidental legislative stereotyping might have stymied the
development of the rest of the equal protection inquiry. But equal protec-
tion doctrine has more work to do than to "smoke out" improper legislative
motives, especially when the measures in question actually address wom-
en's deprivation. Improper legislative inputs surely deserve the Court's
attention. 62 But a more substantive task for the Court, acknowledged by
scholars and sometimes the Court, is to invalidate sex-based classifications
that contribute to the social and economic disadvantage of one sex that
results from discrimination against that sex.Y Yet some measures that are
60. Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 645, 95 S. Ct. at 1232.
61. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979) (invalidating Alabama statute
advantaging women by requiring only men to pay alimony upon divorce); Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982) (invalidating Missis-
sippi's provision advantaging women by providing single-sex educational opportunity);
see also Klarman, supra note 50, at 303-08 (explaining ascendancy of Court's legislative
inputs understanding of equal protection).
62. Although framed as a process-focused concern, the Court's attention to improper
legislative inputs is a bit of a mixed bag of substantive and process-based concerns.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Kahn, which Michael Klarman suggests contains an inchoate
version of the legislative inputs objection, refers to the substantive connections for a
concern with improper process. "[A) legislative classification that distinguishes potential
beneficiaries solely by reference to their gender-based status as widows or widowers ...
must be subjected to close judicial scrutiny . . . because gender-based classifications too
often have been inexcusably utilized to stereotype and stigmatize politically powerless
segments of society." Kahn, 416 U.S. at 357, 94 S. Ct. at 1738 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"No one familiar with this country's history of pervasive sex discrimination against
women can doubt the need for remedial measures to correct the resulting economic
imbalances." Id. at 359, 94 S. Ct. at 1739. "While doubtless some widowers are in
financial need, no one suggests that such need results from sex discrimination as in the
case of widows." Id. at 360, 94 S. Ct. at 1739-40; see also Klarman, supra note 50, at
305-06.
63. Both the majority and Justice Brennan's dissent in Kahn evidence this concern.
416 U.S. at 353-55, 357, 359-60, 94 S. Ct. at 1736-37, 1738, 1739-40 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975). The
Court in VMI defined impermissible sex-based classifications as those that "create or
perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women." 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
Catharine MacKinnon has articulated this view: a measure is discriminatory if it "par-
ticipates in the systemic social deprivation of one sex because of sex." CATHARNE A.
MAcKINNON, SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, 116-18 (1979).
[Vol. 23, No. 3
1997] SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION AFTER UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA 503
intended to and do help eradicate the systemic social deprivation of
women, for example, by addressing basic needs, nonetheless could be
said to contribute to the systemic social deprivation of women in the long
term, in complex and subtle ways, by reinforcing and legitimating out-
moded notions of women's roles.- The current inquiry is not completely
equipped to address measures that both eradicate and contribute to wom-
en's deprivation.
A court seeking to identify discriminatory measures that "participate in
the systemic social deprivation" of women is faced with a dilemma when
measures at once work to eradicate and contribute to women's deprivation.
The facts of Orr v. Orf5 provide a useful example of this dilemma. Under
the Alabama statute at issue, men but not women were required to pay
alimony upon dissolution of a marriage. This and similar provisions
probably reflect a particular, typical allocation of responsibilities during
the marriage and after its dissolution in which women are unremunerated
caretakers and homemakers and men are wage earners. As such, alimony
statutes may be harmful to women to the extent that they perpetuate this
allocation of responsibilities and women's resulting financial dependence
on men in marriage and unequal economic status on divorce.' But such
provisions also address the real and pressing economic inequality and
deprivation that has been demonstrated to accompany divorce for most
women. 67 They work directly to address the unequal economic circum-
stances of men and women that arguably result from aspects of the
institutions of marriage and divorce in which the legal system participates.
The Court's preoccupation with "smoking out" measures that are the
product of inappropriate legislative notions may serve (whether purpose-
fully or incidentally) the concern for women's deprivation in the long-
term; however, it does so at the expense of the concern for women's
immediate deprivation.- Thus, this orientation seems to do only some of
the work necessary to identify measures that are the concern for equal
protection.
69
64. See Mary E. Becker, Politics, Differences and Economic Rights, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 169; accord, Klarman, supra note 50, at 304 n.421.
65. 440 U.S. 268, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979).
66. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault
Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 80-85 (1987).
67. See, e.g., Karen C. Holden & Pamela J. Smock, The Economic Costs of Marital
Dissolution: Why Do Women Bear a Disproportionate Cost? 17 ANN. Rsv. Soc. 52-53, 57-
63, 68-70, 72-74 (1991); Becker, supra note 64, at 174-76.
68. Compare the Court's earlier decisions upholding measures that addressed women's
immediate deprivation but arguably contributed to the perpetuation of stereotypes and
thus women's longer-term deprivation, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 94 S. Ct. 1734
(1974); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975); with the Court's more
recent decisions invalidating these sorts of measures, Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S. Ct.
1102 (1979); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 102 S. Ct. 3331
(1982); see generally Klarman, supra note 50, at 303-08.
69. Note, too, that the theory that withholding measures such as alimony will
dismantle traditional roles and resulting women's financial dependency has so far not
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Hogan provides another example of the dilemma for equal protection
when measures work to eradicate women's deprivation in important
ways but may perpetuate women's deprivation in less obvious ways,
and Hogan introduces the problems particular to the educational con-
text. The Court there concluded that providing an all-women's school
of nursing does not address women's systemic disadvantage, because
women are in fact overrepresented in nursing schools and in the ranks
of employed nurses.70 Moreover, the Court suggested that providing the
all-women's school of nursing might actually harm women, by perpet-
uating "the assumption that nursing is a field for women" thereby
contributing to depressed nurses' wages.71 Hogan does not attempt to
balance its concern for the harm to women that comes from perpetuating
the assumption that nursing is a women's field against the decided
benefit that accrues to women from education in general and the benefit
that accrues to women from single-sex education in particular.
C. The Special Context of Single-Sex Education
Single-sex education by definition requires a sex-based classification.
In order to help the Court develop adequate tools for determining when
a government can provide single-sex education, it may be useful to
disaggregate the benefits or advantages provided to the included sex.
The included sex is advantaged in several ways denied to the ex-
cluded sex. First, the included sex is the beneficiary of education
generally (assuming the offering to be within the bounds of "appro-
priate" education, even if not the best possible offering). The intrinsic
and instrumental values of an education are difficult to deny.72 Second,
the included sex is the beneficiary of having the single-sex educational
option. Members of the benefited sex at least enjoy the ability to choose
a single-sex environment. Beyond the benefits of plural educational
opportunities, empirical evidence seems to largely support the claim
been borne out, and, meanwhile, plenty of women suffer real, immediate economic
deprivation. See MARY BECKER ET AL., CASES AND MARTERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE:
TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 510-14 (citing Pamela Smock, The Economic Costs of Marital
Disruption for Young Women in the United States: Have They Declined Over the Past
Two Decades? University of Wisconsin-Madison Institute for Research on Poverty, Dis-
cussion Paper No. 984-92 (Sept. 1992)).
70. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
71. 458 U.S. at 730, 102 S. Ct. at 3339.
72. The Court, most notably in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct.
686 (1954), has long (though not consistently) recognized the special position of educa-
tion. At one time, many members of the Court viewed education as rising to the level
of a fundamental right. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982)
(invalidating on equal protection grounds Texas policy denying free public schooling to
children of illegal aliens and noting importance of education); Klarman, supra note 50,
at 288 n.342 (discussing Douglas Papers and other internal documents suggesting that
"four of the five Justices in the Plyler majority were prepared forthrightly to hold
education a fundamental interest for equal protection purposes").
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that single-sex education is beneficial and effective for women; empir-
ical data less clearly support the claim that single-sex education is
beneficial and effective for men.7 3 Third, the included sex is the ben-
eficiary of the particular subject offerings (e.g., baccalaureate nursing
program) and pedagogical philosophy (e.g., adversative method) of the
school in question, and of the other tangible and intangible benefits of
receiving an education from that school.
Although this disaggregation is crude, it readily reveals a source of
myopia in Hogan: in evaluating whether MUW's School of Nursing
actually served the compensatory purpose advanced by Mississippi,
i.e., eradicating discrimination against women, the Court neglected to
consider education's role in providing "intentional[] and direct[] as-
73. For recent studies supporting the claim that single-sex education is beneficial for
women in terms of satisfaction and achievement, see M. Elizabeth Tidball, Women's
Colleges and Women Achievers Revisited, in RECONSTRUCTING THE ACADEMY: WOMEN'S
EDUCATION AND WOMEN'S STUDIES 206 (Elizabeth Minnich, et al. eds., 1988); Joy K. Rice
& Annette Hemmings, Women's Colleges and Women Achievers: An Update in RECON-
STRUCTING THE ACADEMY, supra at 220; M. Elizabeth Tidball, Women's Colleges: Excep-
tional Conditions, Not Exceptional Talent, Produce High Achievers, in EDUCATING THE
MAJORITY: WOMEN CHALLENGE TRADITION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 157 (Carol S. Pearson, et al.
eds., 1989) [hereinafter Exceptional Conditions]; ALEXANDER ASTIN, WHAT MATTERS IN
COLLEGE? FOUR CRITICAL YEARS REVISITED (1992); Daryl G. Smith, Lisa E. Wolf, & Diane E.
Morrison, Paths to Success: Factors Related to the Impact of Women's Colleges, 66 J.
HIGHER EDUC, 245 (1995). Note, however, that there is too little evidence to determine
whether this statement applies to the experiences of women of color: See id.; see also
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (criticizing antidiscrimination law's treatment of race and
gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis). For support of the
claim that single-sex education is beneficial and effective for boys and men, as well as
girls and women, see Cornelius Riordan, Reconsidering Same Gender Schools: The VMI
Case and Beyond, EDUC. WK., Feb. 23, 1994, at 48 ("Single gender schools generally are
more effective academically than coeducational schools. This is true at all levels of
school, from elementary to higher education.... Single gender schools work. They work
for girls and boys, women and men, whites and nonwhites.... [But rJesearch has
demonstrated that the [beneficial] effects of single gender schools are greatest among
students who have been disadvantaged historically - females and racial/ethnic/religious
minorities (both males and females)."). But cf. Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
by the American Association of University Professors et al. at 26-27, VMI, 116 S. Ct.
2264 (1996) (No. 94-1941) ("[Available] data provide no support for the efficacy of single-
sex education for young men. . . .Not only is there an absence of data to support the
conclusion that single-sex education benefits males, some studies even demonstrate a
negative effect." Among the negative effects observed in all-male learning environments
were a higher incidence of sexism in writing, in classroom displays, and in class
discussion.) Commentators have cautioned against the societal effects of preserving all-
male colleges and universities in a world where women are still unequal to men: they
are "likely to be a witting or unwitting device for preserving tacit assumptions of male
superiority - assumptions for which women must eventually pay." C. JENCKS AND D.
REISMAN, THE ACADEMIC REVOLUTION 297-98 (1968); accord Deborah L. Rhode, Association
and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 106 (1986); Valorie K. Vojdik, Girls' Schools After
VMI: Do They Make the Grade? 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 69 (1997).
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sist[ance to] members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened." '74
Education in general is crucial to eliminating the systemic social,
political, and economic deprivation of women. Where the government
has decided to provide education for women, it is going to contribute
to dismantling, rather than perpetuating women's deprivation, in the
sense and to the extent that education generally does. A court's inquiry
in the educational context should not discount altogether the general
contribution of education to dismantling stereotypes and to countering
systemic social deprivation of women.
And, having found that MUW's School of Nursing was not truly
single-sex,75 the Court in Hogan was not required to balance the long-
term detriment that it identified as stemming from the subject matter
of the School of Nursing's program offerings with the benefit provided
to women by the single-sex structure of the program. Given current
empirical data that single-sex higher education is in fact beneficial and
effective for the women who choose it, 76 the provision of a single-sex
school for women is likely to contribute additionally to eliminating the
systemic social, political and economic deprivation of women. Nor did
the Court consider any benefits stemming from the subject matter of
the School of Nursing's program offerings, as a counter to the detri-
ments. Note that Hogan managed a bit of surgery here: by carefully
limiting its inquiry to the School of Nursing at MUW, and leaving
untouched the remaining schools and programs at MUW, the Court
was able to view in isolation that school within the university that
most clearly contributed to the perpetuation of traditional women's
roles and, as the Court found, arguably did not open any new doors
to women. Thus, even had the Court taken into account the benefits
accruing to women from the single-sex nature of the program and the
benefits accruing to women from the subject matter of the program
offerings, it might nonetheless have found that the School of Nursing,
considered alone, contributed in problematic ways to the perpetuation
of stereotypes and women's longer-term deprivation. But the Court
failed to discuss such tradeoffs. Whether the Court got the boundaries
of the relevant package of educational opportunities right is a matter
of lesser importance, to be determined on a case-by-case basis by
reference to the particular facts (e.g., separation of admissions, facilities,
etc.). The more important lesson is that the Court overemphasized one
aspect of the equal protection concern in the higher education context,
to the exclusion of other aspects.
74. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 3338
(1982).
75. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
76. But see David Hoffman, Challenge to Single-Sex Schools Under Equal Protection:
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 6 HARV. WOM.N's L. J. 163, 172 (1983)
("[Tihe notion that a woman's choice to attend a sex-segregated school is truly voluntary
is deeply undercut by the reality . . . that one of the factors that make single-sex schools
attractive to women is the sexist treatment they receive at coeducational schools.").
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It is not clear why the Hogan Court felt compelled to give great
weight to the concern for dismantling stereotypes and their contribution
to women's long term disadvantage, but scant attention to the concern
for education and its contribution to women's more immediate advan-
tage. Outdated charters aside,77 few would argue that single-sex wom-
en's colleges and universities are an important or even likely means
today for relegating women to the world of "fancy, general and practical
needlepoint." 78 Thus, even assuming that inaccurate stereotypes are the
chief business of equal protection jurisprudence, it is not clear that we
ought to be especially suspicious of the legislative motives when, today,
a legislature creates or maintains single-sex higher educational oppor-
tunities for women. 7 Quite to the contrary, many single-sex women's
colleges are at the center of efforts to challenge outmoded stereotypes
and to enable women to dismantle systemic barriers to realizing full
social and economic equality. 0 The very existence of women's colleges
and universities today helps challenge the notion that assimilation into
a society structured and dominated by males ought to be a goal for
social policy in general, or equal protection in particular. And for
single-sex schools long in existence, a focus on the presumptions of
the enacting legislature under a legislative inputs orientation is similarly
unuseful, given the enormous evolution in these schools' educational
offerings, missions and student populations. 81 While founding legisla-
tures surely harbored very limited notions of women's place in society
and so established schools where women could learn only needlepoint
and other skills suitable for that place, some of these same schools are
today among the leaders in challenging now outmoded ideas and in
77. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 733-34, 102 S. Ct. at 3341 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that MUW's failure to update its charter may not only have been embarrassing
to MUW, but may have in part contributed to MUW finding itself in litigation). The
majority quotes the charter's outdated language at length. Id. at 720, 102 S. Ct. at 3334
n.1.
78. Id. (quoting statement of purpose from MUW charter, which includes instructing
the "girls of the state" in these three sorts of needlepoint).
79. Except, of course, where the legislature's creation of a single-sex school for
women is a truly transparent effort only to preserve existing single-sex opportunities for
men. See, e.g., VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2282-86. But cf. Vojdik, supra note 73; Cynthia Fuchs
Epstein, The Myths and Justifications of Sex Segregation in Higher Education: VMI and
The Citadel, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 101 (1997).
80. See, e.g., Ruth Schmidt, The Role of Women's Colleges in the Future, in WOMEN
AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 198 (John Mack Faragher & Florence Howe
eds., 1988) ("[W]omen's colleges have a history of producing graduates in the sciences
(and other disciplines where women are normally underrepresented) which far surpasses
the proportion of women who study those subjects in coeducational environments." Id.
at 200.); Exceptional Conditions, supra note 73; accord VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2276 n.7
(citing Brief for Twenty-Six Private Women's Colleges as Amici Curiae).
81. See Klarman, supra note 50, at 308 ("Put briefly, [under a legislative inputs
orientation,] the thoughts of the enacting legislature [are] dispositive - was the gender
classification motivated by a genuinely compensatory objective or by a 'traditional way
of thinking about females?').
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dismantling frameworks of inferiority. We might ask how we can better
frame the equal protection concerns in the context of education.
II. CAPABILITIES AND THE QUALITY OF A HUMAN LIFE
A commitment to equality does not itself supply any particular
conception of what must be equal. 82 One theory focuses on human
well-being and features capabilities as a measure of well-being, as
opposed to, for example, utility or primary goods. This approach
identifies inequalities in well-being by reference to what individuals
are able to do and be. Beginning in 1990, the United Nations Devel-
opment Program ("UNDP") adopted this focus on capabilities as a
measure of well-being. 3 Very recently, the UNDP has begun to examine
gender differentials in capabilities. In 1996, it found that women's
capabilities are in every country - the United States included -
currently less fully realized than are men's. Other insights from the
field of development economics shed light on the close connection
between education and improved capabilities. This backdrop is impor-
tant for understanding the social problems of less and more developed
countries alike, for examining the role of education in a particular
society, and for addressing the grave situation of sex inequality.
A. Capabilities
Amartya Sen, a prominent thinker in development economics and
moral philosophy, has argued persuasively that we ought to measure
humans' quality of life by reference to their capabilities. 4 "The capa-
bility of a person," Sen explains, "reflects the alternative combinations
of functionings the person can achieve, and from which he or she can
choose one collection." 8 5 Functionings focus on a person's state; they
are "the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading
a life." '8 6 Some functionings are quite basic. Among these, according
to Sen, are "being adequately nourished, [and] being in good health.
87
These sorts of basic functionings are likely to be valued strongly and
widely. Other functionings are less likely to be valued as strongly by
as many, for example "achieving self-respect." 8 A person's capability
82. See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 92 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
83. Since 1990, the UNDP has compiled a human development index ("HDI"), a
selection of indicators of achievements corresponding to basic human capabilities. In
1996, it introduced a corresponding, multidimensional measure of human deprivation,
the capability poverty measure ("CPM"), which "focuses on human capabilities, [and]
reflects the percentage of people who lack basic, or minimally essential, human capabil-
ities." UNITED NATIONs DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996, at
27-30 [hereinafter UNDP REPORT].
84. Capability, supra note 8; Equality, supra note 8; Gender, supm note 8.
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might be thought of as the range of options actually or meaningfully
available to that person as she decides how to live. Capability invokes
notions of possibility and choice. ("His ability to be adequately nour-
ished is unconstrained by either social conditions or personal circum-
stances." "She is free and able to be literate.") Capability deprivation
occurs when there are constraints on a person's ability to pursue this
or that way of living. Functionings, by contrast, are the states of being
achieved by a person, the things a person does, the way a person lives.
The life a person leads is described by a sequence or collection of
functionings. ("He is nourished." "She is literate.")
For many problems of social policy, capability is important quite
apart from achieved functionings.89 Functionings - doing, being,
achieving - are in a sense the building blocks of the capability
approach, but they are not all that matters: "The approach is based on
a view of living as a combination of various 'doings and beings,' with
quality of life to be assessed in terms of the capability to achieve
valuable functionings. '"g Sen illustrates the difference between one
functioning (the state of being adequately nourished) and the corre-
sponding capability (the capability to be adequately nourished):
If achieved functionings .. . were all that mattered, we might be
as worried about the rich person fasting as about the starving
poor. If we are more concerned to eliminate the hunger of the
latter, it is primarily because the former has the capability to be
well nourished but chooses not to, whereas the latter lacks that
capability and is forced into the state of starvation.91
Importantly, the capability approach was conceived in the specific
context of evaluating inequality and advantage. In his seminal essay
on the subject, Sen takes as a starting point the question "equality of
what?"'9 2 His answer gives content to the commitment to equality. It
also supplies a measure, a tool for evaluating equality. According to
Sen, individual well-being and inequality in individuals' well-being
are best judged by reference to an account that includes a notion of
'''basic capabilities': a person being able to do certain basic things.' '
3




Sen concedes both that there will be problems with determining an
index of capabilities, and that ideas about the relative importance of
89. Id. at 45.
90. Id. at 31.
91. Id. at 45.
92. Equality, supra note 8, at 353.
93. Id., at 367.
94. Capability, supra note 8, at 30.
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various capabilities are likely to be culture-dependent as Nevertheless,
agreement on the evaluative space (that is what the objects of value
are) is itself useful.?6 The capability approach identifies a basis for
evaluation and for detecting injustice in the form of inequality: human
capabilities.
The UNDP, for example, has selected three capabilities as "basic,"
by which to measure human development. "[The capability to lead] a
life free of avoidable morbidity is one such capability, [the capability
to be] informed and educated is another, and [the capability to be]
well-nourished is a third. '- 7 Notably, education is among these "foun-
dational capabilities."-9 8 The UNDP defines poverty or deprivation ac-
cordingly: "Deprivation is reflected in a lack of basic capabilities -
when people are unable to reach a certain level of human achievement
or functioning." '99 The UNDP's capability poverty measure ("CPM") is
an index of "capability shortfalls in [these] three basic dimensions of
human development." 100
B. Women's Relative Capability Deprivation
As a group, women's capabilities are impoverished relative to men's.
This disparity holds true in every society today. 10 1 Because they are
born female, fifty-one percent of the world's population face relative
capability poverty. Whether measured in terms of basic functionings or
more complex ones, women are less well off. Thus, according to the
UNDP's gender-related development index ("GDI"), which examines
relative achievements in life expectancy, educational attainment, and
income, women suffer more than men at the level of basic needs.
10 2
And, according to the UNDP's gender empowerment measure ("GEM"),
which measures gender inequality in important areas of economic and
political participation and decisionmaking, women suffer more than
men at the level of full realization of their human capabilities.0 3
The GDI value for the United States is 0.927 (unity would indicate
the absence of a gender gap, according to the measures indexed). While
high relative to other countries, this value nonetheless indicates an
identifiable gender gap at the level of basic needs. Notably, although
females fare as well as males in terms of the adult literacy rate (both
95. Equality, supra note 8, at 368; see generally Capability, supra note 8, at 31-32,
46-49.
96. Capability, supra note 8, at 46-49.




101. See, e.g., id. at 32 ("[N]o society treats its women as well as its men.").
102. Id. at 32-34.
103. Id. at 34-36; see also id. at 23 ("Political space has always been monopolized by
men. Although women constitute half the electorate, they hold only 12% of the seats in
parliaments and 6% in national cabinets.").
[Vol. 23, No. 3
1997] SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION AFTER UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA 511
at 99.0%), and better than males in terms of life expectancy at birth
(female life expectancy is 79.4 years; male life expectancy is 72.6
years), and "combined primary, secondary and tertiary [school] gross
enrollment ratio" (98.3% of females and 93.5% of males enrolled), the
gender gap is pronounced when measuring earned income share, with
40.1% of income earned by females and 59.9% of income earned by
males.104 .
Notably, in no country does the GEM equal or exceed 0.800.105 And
only in ten countries does the GEM exceed 0.600.106 The United States
ranks ninth among these ten; its GEM value is 0.645.107 In the United
States, although women constitute over half the electorate, women hold
only 10.4% of the seats in Congress. 10 8 Women comprise only 42.0%
of administrators and managers.1 09 Women fare better in the category
of professional and technical workers, with 52.7% of these positions
occupied by women.110 And, rounding out the indicators contributing
to the GEM, women's share of income is 40%.ill
C. Enhancing Capabilities Through Education
Education is crucial to enhancing human capabilities. As both an
intrinsic and instrumental good, education contributes to capabilities
on two levels.11 2 Education is an intrinsic good; being educated is a
valuable achievement in and of itself. Providing educational opportu-
nities improves beneficiaries' capability of having an education or being
educated. Education is also an instrumental good. Providing educational
opportunities contributes to improving many other capabilities, ranging
104. Id. at 138 tbl.2.
105. Id. at 34, 141-43 tbl.3.
106. Id.





112. In the context of human development in India and elsewhere in the world, Jean
Drdze and Amartya Sen identify five distinct ways in which education contributes
intrinsically and instrumentally to the freedom of a person, i.e., a person's capability:
(1) intrinsic value of education; (2) instrumental value for personal roles: education can
help a person do many things that he or she values, like getting a job or more generally
making use of economic opportunities; (3) instrumental value for social roles: education
and improved literacy facilitate public discussion of social needs, encourage informed
discussion of collective demands (e.g., for health care), and contribute to better utilization
of services that are available; (4) instrumental value for process roles: process of education
has benefits apart from its substantive aims, e.g., corresponding reduction in child labor,
increased contact with peers, broadening social and cultural horizons; and (5) empow-
erment and distributive value: improved literacy and educational achievements of dis-
advantaged groups can increase their ability to resist oppression, to organize politically,
and to secure a fairer deal. See JEAN DRzE & AmARTYA SEN, INDIA: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY 14-15 (1995).
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from such basic ones as the capability of being well nourished, the
capability of being sheltered, and the capability of having remunerative
work, 1 13 to more complex ones, like the capability to participate fully
in public life.
1 4
In the United States, as elsewhere, education is indispensable to
enhancing women's capabilities, and, importantly, to remedying sex
inequality in capabilities. 115 The connection between women's educa-
tion and basic capabilities is especially dramatic in developing coun-
tries. The most fundamental challenge for health in many of these
countries may still be inadequate sanitation, given people's incomplete
understandings of the sources of resulting illnesses and, importantly,
preventive measures."6 According to some development experts, edu-
cation is the single most important factor for realizing gains in human
health, for the ability to lead a life free of avoidable morbidity. Edu-
cating girls, they argue, is particularly crucial. "7 Literacy and numeracy
are important tools of self-reliance and self-defense: an illiterate person
is much less well equipped to get on the right bus, to enforce her
inheritance rights, to defend herself in court, or to obtain a bank loan." 8
Women in Development scholars have also noted the primary role of
women's education in enabling more complex capabilities in these
countries:
[I]t is clear that Third World women will have very little impact
on national development priorities, political ideologies, and de-
velopment planning until they are literate and have the basic
arithmetic skills with which to analyze their political and eco-
nomic systems." 9
113. For example, according to the UNDP, in contrast to countries experiencing
economic growth without a corresponding growth in employment (let alone employment
that meets the aspirations of people for job security, remunerative work, or creative work)
"[h]igh employment economies have generally invested heavily in the development of
human capabilities - particularly education, health and skills." Id. at 7-8.
114. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 140-43 (1993).
115. Id. at 6.
116. Nicholas D. Kristof, For Third World, Water Is Still a Deadly Drink, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 1997, at Al, A6.
117. Id. at A6 (explaining that some countries have achieved public health gains by
promoting basic education and noting the particular connection between educating girls
and their improved ability to understand the dangers of poor hygiene and make better
health care decisions in general and for their families).
118. Drdze and Sen make these and other points in the context of India, supra note
112, at 109.
119. Susan C. Bourque & Kay B. Warren, Access is Not Enough: Gender Perspectives
on Technology and Education, in PERSISTENT INEQUALITIES: WOMEN & WORLD DEVELOPMENT
83, 96 (Irene Tinker ed., 1990). Accord DRtZE & SEN, supra note 112, at 87-92, 137-39
(pointing out that the uneducated and less well-educated are less able to ensure that
their needs - including their specific educational needs and priorities - are addressed
in the political process; thus there is a self-perpetuating circle); but cf. VMI, 116 S. Ct.
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In more developed countries, too, women's education is important for
realizing fully their capabilities.120 In the United States, there is a
present and historical correlation between higher education for women
and enhanced vocational opportunity. 121 "The more education a woman
has, the more likely she is to be employed [and] ... [t]he disparity
between the proportion of men and women who are employed decreases
with higher levels of education.' 22 Thus, in 1987, fifty-four percent of
women with only a four-year high school education were employed,
compared to seventy-four percent of men; sixty-two percent of women
with only one to three years of college education were employed,
compared to seventy-nine percent of men; and seventy-two percent of
women with four or more years of college were employed, compared
to eighty-five percent of men. 23 Higher levels of educational attainment
for women also correspond with an increasing likelihood that women
will occupy positions with decision-making authority and economic
power rather than support or service positions. 4
Ill. THE CAPABILITY APPROACH TO ASSESSING SINGLE-SEX HIGHER
EDUCATION
A capability approach - that is, some version of the approach put
forth by Amartya Sen and outlined in Part II - would provide courts
at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing against heightened scutiny for sex-based classi-
fications on theory that women, a numerical majority of the electorate, indeed enjoy
political power and citing the "long list of legislation" from the Equal Pay Act of 1963
to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 as proof of women's power in poltical
processes).
120. While the problems of developing and developed economies may be quite differ-
ent, the lessons connecting capability deprivation and solutions such as education might
usefully be shared.
121. See, e.g., Barbara Sicherman, College and Careers: Historical Perspectives on the
Lives and Work Patterns of Women College Graduates, in WOMEN AND HIGHER EDUCATION
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 130, 134 John Mack Farragher & Florence Howe eds., 1988).
122. JUDITH G. TouCHTON & LYNNE DAVIS, FACT BOOK ON WOMEN IN HIGHER EDUCATION
29 (1991).
123. Id.
124. Higher levels of educational attainment for women correspond with increasing
likelihood that women will occupy managerial and professional positions (40 occupations,
including finance, purchasing, accounting, engineering, medicine, nursing, teaching,
library science, and counseling; in 1987, 70% of employed white women and 68% of
employed black women with four or more years of college were employed in these
positions) over technical, sales, and administrative support positions (including techni-
cians, cashiers, secretaries, receptionists, and clerks. In 1987, for both black and white
women with a high school diploma or one to three years of college, the most likely
occupation) over service occupations (including household, protective service, food
preparation, and personal service occupations; in 1987, 60% of black women and 35%
of white women with less than four years of high school were employed in these
positions). Id. at 31. Notably, the ability to occupy such positions is one indicator of sex
equality according to the UNDP's GEM, which assesses gender differentials beyond basic
capabilities.
514 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW
with a useful tool for assessing single-sex educational arrangements,
particularly single-sex higher education. This approach might improve
the Court's inquiry by providing a common, concrete metric for eval-
uating various arrangements, one that permits courts to acknowledge
tradeoffs (e.g., where an educational arrangement both addresses and
perpetuates women's relative capability deprivation). This approach
provides a more useful, comprehensive orientation for the Court's
inquiry than is supplied by a legislative inputs orientation. Although
the contours of such an approach would be difficult to specify in the
abstract, I offer a tentative decisional framework.
A. Frameworks for Thinking about Education: Capabilities
The capability approach is particularly well-suited for thinking about
education and, therefore, for detecting inequality in this context. As
noted above, it is concerned not simply with states of doing and being
achieved by a person (e.g., the state of being adequately nourished),
but also, more crucially, with the alternative functionings available to
the person, from which she is free to choose. That is to say, it matters
for analysis that a person is able to be adequately nourished, whether
or not she chooses to be adequately nourished (recall the difference
between the wealthy fasting person and the impoverished starving
person). By taking capabilities to be the informational base for evalu-
ation, this approach not only acknowledges education's intrinsic value,
but also captures the instrumental function of education.'25
Moreover, the capability approach fills out the Court's inquiry just
where it is most anemic. As the Court has recognized, sex-based
classifications may not "create or perpetuate the legal, social, and
economic inferiority of women."' 26 But, as noted above, an arguably
compensatory measure might at once eradicate and contribute to wom-
en's deprivation. Yet, as I have pointed out, the Court's equal protection
inquiry provides no basis for a choice among these opposing effects,
at least not one that consciously seeks to resolve this dilemma. Instead,
the Court's equal protection inquiry most often skirts the dilemma,
resolving it only incidentally, by reference to a concern with imper-
missible legislative inputs.
The capability approach might improve the Court's inquiry by pro-
viding a common metric that is both concrete and substantively more
useful than a focus on legislative inputs. First, the capability approach
provides a metric for appraisal. A measure may increase some capabil-
ities, such as the capability of being adequately nourished, but diminish
125. See also SUNSTEIN, supra note 114, at 140-43 (recognizing that despite courts'
institutional limitations, "[t]here is a close connection between education and constitu-
tionally specified rights, and equality in basic life prospects is a clear theme of the Civil
War amendments," such that a more aggressive judicial role in cases of educational
equality might be warranted by the commitment to deliberative democracy).
126. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
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others, such as the capability of being socially integrated. While not
purporting to give relative rankings for the various capabilities (with
the possible exception of a group of "basic capabilities") the common
metric of the capability approach at least allows the Court to acknowl-
edge and discuss tradeoffs. Second, this approach supplies a concrete
orientation that is more useful for actually getting at the problem,
particularly in the educational context, than is abstract debate. 127 Third,
the capability approach reinstates neglected substantive concerns, at
least as a counterbalance to the Court's process-based concern for
legislative inputs. 128 A focus on what individuals, in the aggregate, are
able to do and be usefully identifies inequalities, including sex in-
quality.
The courts are perhaps not meant to be the chief venue for working
out effective educational arrangements, or even for ensuring some sort
of sex equality in educational opportunities. Courts are, however, cru-
cially involved when the legislature decides, as it should, to undertake
these tasks.129 Even within the bounds of courts' institutional limita-
tions, there is considerable room to develop useful evaluative tools,
especially where, as here, the tools fill out underdeveloped aspects of
the present inquiry.
Finally, a version of the capability approach has recently been im-
plemented by some governmental institutions seeking to evaluate well-
being and equality, demonstrating its workability in practice as well as
in theory. The UNDP has recently begun to evaluate aggregate capa-
bilities in order to assess human well-being. The UNDP's measures
demonstrate how one might look to indicators to learn whether and in
what areas people's capabilities are realized or impoverished. Impor-
tantly, for questions of sex inequality, the UNDP's measures can be
used to assess relative capability deprivation between sexes.
The Court, within the limits of its institutional function, has also
provided glimpses of what this kind of assessment might look like. It
127. See, e.g., Christopher Jencks, Whom Must We Treat Equally for Educational
Opportunity to Be Equal? 98 ETmics 518, 532-33 (1988) ("If equal opportunity can mean
distributing resources either equally or unequally, if it can be compatible with inequalities
that favor either the initially advantaged or the initially disadvantaged, and if the relative
weight of these principles can vary from one situation to the next, it is small wonder
that most Americans support the idea. A skeptic might wonder, however, whether an
idea that can embrace so much means anything at all.").
128. One virtue of this shift is that it examines the present, rather than past, mission
and offerings of the college or university at issue. A focus on the appropriateness of the
legislature's motives at the time it created the Mississippi University for Women is likely
to give unhelpful (and potentially misleading) answers to the question what does the
MUW do to enhance the capabilities of its students and graduates today. Single-sex
schools for women in particular have evolved enormously from the time of their respective
charters, from places where women went to learn "fancy, general and practical needle-
work" to places that challenge such limited notions of women's work. See supra' notes
77-81 and accompanying text.
129. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 114, at 137-43.
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has, at times, refered to indicators to learn about something like ca-
pabilties. For example, in Kahn v. Shevin,130 the Court upheld a
property tax exemption for, widows because of the greater financial
difficulties likely to be faced upon the death of a spouse by women
than by men, due to sex discrimination. The Court's concern could
plausibly be thought of as a concern for women's capability of having
sufficiently remunerative employment: "Whether from overt discrimi-
nation or from the socialization process of a male-dominated culture,
the job market is inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest
paid jobs.' 131 The Court refered to Department of Labor data as an
indicator of women's relative earning power. 132 The Court highlighted
the fact that women at the time of the Court's inquiry earned only
57.9% of what men earned.1 33 Women's capabilities in this regard could
be said to be impoverished relative to men. Hogan's concern for what
the availability of a baccaulareate nursing degree could do for women
also plausibly stemmed from underpinnings consonant with a capabil-
ities approach. Hogan's mention of the depressed wages in the field of
nursing and the connection between these low wages and the high
proportion of women in the field of nursing seems to signal a concern
similar to that exemplified in Kahn, i.e., a concern for women's capa-
bility of having sufficiently remunerative employment. But Hogan failed
to pursue the inquiry fully.
B. Toward A Capability Approach for Assessing Educational
Arrangements
The contours of a capability approach for assessing educational ar-
rangements cannot be fully specified at this point, and this is not my
aim here. 134 Nonetheless a possible decisional framework follows. Along
the way, I suggest some resolutions, under this understanding of a
capability approach, to some of the problems identified in Part I.
As noted above, education is crucial to enhancing capabilities; this
is true for both sexes. Both an intrinsic and instrumental good, edu-
cation enters the capability calculus on two levels. First, given its
intrinsic value, improved educational opportunities work directly to
enhance an individual's capabilities. The relevant capability is that of
having an education or being educated. Second, given its instrumental
value, improved educational opportunities work indirectly to enhance
an individual's capabilities. The relevant capabilities are many, ranging
from such basic ones as the capability of being well nourished and the
130. 416 U.S. 351, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974).
131. Id. at 352, 94 S. Ct. at 1736.
132. Id. at 353-54, 94 S. Ct. at 1736-37.
133. Id. at 353, 94 S. Ct. at 1736.
134. This is due in part to the difficulties of specification in the abstract (even given
a limitation to the educational context); see also Capability, supra note 8, at 31-32, 46-
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capability of being sheltered, to more complex ones, like the capability
of participating fully in public life.
Keeping in mind education's several contributions to a person's
capabilities, single-sex education might be justifiable by reference to a
two-part framework. Single-sex education might be permissible (1) if




(2) if and only if, the particular offering addresses the capability deficit.
The second part of the inquiry might itself be thought of as having two
components, the first examining whether the program, viewed in terms
of its curriculum, subject matter, pedagogy, and other tangible and
intangible benefits, addresses the capability deficit, and the second
examining the actual contribution of single-sex education to addressing
the capability deficit13
6
The following sections offer a tentative application of this decisional
framework. Section one applies the framework to an educational ar-
rangement that makes a single-sex option available to one sex but not
the other. This was the situation confronted by the Court in the first
phase of United States v. Virginia and in Hogan.137 Section two applies
the framework to an educational arrangement that makes a single-sex
option available to both sexes. This was the situation confronted by
the Court in the second phase of United States v. Virginia, upon
Viriginia's construction of the Virginia Women's Inistitute for Leader-
ship. 1
38
1. Single-Sex Educational Option for One Sex Only
Where a single-sex educational option is made available only to one
sex, as was the case in United States v. Virginia and Hogan, a zero
necessarily gets entered on the ledger for the other, non-benefited sex.
This is so because only members of the benefited sex may avail them-
selves of the educational option provided; thus only members of the
135. "Relative" here means vis-a-vis the excluded sex. Note that some subgroups,
e.g., black males, may be in a position of capability deprivation relative to other
subgroups, e.g., white males (and therefore arguably warrant particular attention from
educators, policymakers, and courts), but nonetheless not be in a position of capability
deprivation relative to black females, a situation raised by Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775
F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991). This question would need to be explored further but
is beyond the scope of this essay. See infra note 137. See generally Note, Inner-City
Single-Sex Schools: Educational Reform or Invidious Discrimination? 105 HARv. L. REV.
1741 (1992).
136. Note that this second part of the inquiry resembles the form of the means-end fit
required of the standard equal protection test articulated by the Court, although this
approach supplies a substance that is more particularly tailored for the educational
context.
137. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan faced this
situation in the'context of primary education in Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp.
1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
138. The Court faced this situation in the context of secondary education in Vorcheimer
v. School Dist. of Pa., 430 U.S. 703, 97 S. Ct. 1671 (1977) (per curiam).
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benefited sex realize an improvement in their capability of having an
education. 1 39 So we come to the point described by Hogan's footnote
seventeen (but somewhat obfuscated by the majority and dissenting
opinions in United States v. Virginia): we must determine when it is
justifiable to provide such a benefit to one sex while excluding the
other.
Because of the present relative capability deprivation of women,
measures providing an educational option only for women are more
likely to be justifiable, by reference to the first part of the inquiry.
Measures providing an educational option only for men, on the other
hand, are less likely to be justifiable. Note, of course, that this prediction
is contingent: the permissibility of educational arrangments under the
first part of this approach is sensitive to shifts in relative capabilities.
Given the gender gap in capabilities that existed at the time of United
States v. Virginia, the Court could have found (and could be viewed
as having found) that excluding women from the capability-enhancing
benefits of a VMI education, while bestowing them on men, only
exacerbated the capability imbalance between men and women.
140
Whether an educational offering also satisfies the second part of the
inquiry, however, depends on whether the particular offering addresses
the capability deficit.
For the first component of the second part of the inquiry, a court
would inquire whether the curriculum, subject matter, pedagogy and
other tangible and intangible offerings of the program actually address
the capability deprivation; a court would also be alert to the program's
potential, instead or as well, to perpetuate this relative deprivation.'
139. This acknowledgement captures a portion of what Hogan missed, with respect to
the contribution of education, generally, to recipients' capabilities. See supra notes 72-
76 and accompanying text.
140. This capability differential between males and females, more than anything, might
also make sense of the result in Garrett. Although the "at risk" male youth targeted by
the Detroit Board of Education were surely themselves capability deprived relative to
males priveleged by race and class, the opportunity costs of providing a special, single-
sex educational option for "at-risk" males only, but not for similarly "at risk" female
youth might have been viewed as at least leaving the gender capability differential intact.
More thinking needs to be done, however, about the application of a capability approach
to the intersection of race and gender. Note, too, that subgroups may have differing
capability landscapes, such that these subgroups in fact become the relevant group for
purposes of assessing relative capability deprivation. See, e.g., DREZE & SEN, supra note
112, at 3-4, 44-56 (describing vast differences in capabilities within India, among Indian
states).
141. It is interesting to note, as Chief Justice Rehnquist did, that the VMI Court had
no evidence that the "adversative method" is in fact a useful pedagogical tool that might
be said to contribute to graduates' capabilities. 116 S. Ct. at 2291 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring); accord Diane Avery, Institutional Myths, Historical Narratives and Social
Science Evidence: Reading the "Record" in the Virginia Military Institute Case, 5 So.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 189, 306-09 (1996). However, VMI's extensive alumni
network, endowment, record for producing leaders, and the like should be viewed as
contributing to graduates' capabilities. The Court emphasized these features of VMI at
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This focus on the function of education in enhancing capabilities might
give perspective to the ruling in Hogan. MUW's School of Nursing did
not, in the eyes of the Court, provide to women anything that they did
not already have. It did not enhance the alternative combinations of
things that graduates could do and be in leading their lives. The Court
had evidence before it that at the relevant times ninety-six to ninety-
eight percent of nurses in the United States were women, and that
nursing was stereotypically a women's profession, resulting in it being
low status and low paying. Given this evidence, the Court may be
understood as having determined that MUW's nursing program did not
enhance - and may have actually contributed to a long-term decrease
in - its graduates' capabilities.112 Yet the Court did not appear fully
to engage the capability inquiry, in that it failed to account for the
contribution of an MUW education to enhancing women's capabilities,
including basic capabilities related to immediate needs. The Court
nowhere acknowledged, for example, that MUW's nursing program
surely contributed to its graduates' capabilities of being well-nourished
and being sheltered. The Court would have needed to discuss both the
positive and negative effects on women's capabilities to determine
whether MUW's nursing program addressed the relative capability
deprivation of women, thus acknowledging the tradeoffs that its result
would require.
The second component of the second part of the inquiry would
require a court to ask whether the single-sex structure actually worked
to address the capability deficit. Current empirical data seem to dem-
onstrate that single-sex higher education provides benefits to women,
and may also demonstrate that single-sex education provides benefits
to men.' 43 However, the claims that single-sex education benefits men
and that it benefits women are clearly contingent. Should further
empirical study reveal, for example, that single-sex education (or a
certain version of it) does not benefit women, single-sex arrangements
for women would no longer satisfy this portion of the Court's inquiry.
The historical evolution of single-sex colleges and universities, from
the only places women could go (and while there, to learn only
the outset of its opinion: "VMI has notably succeeded in its mission to produce leaders;
among its alumni are military generals, Members of Congress, and business executives.
The school's alumni overwhelmingly perceive that their VMI training helped them to
realize their personal goals." Id. at 2269.
142. The Court might have ruled differently, on this score, if MUW had been an all-
women's engineering and technical school, given evidence that women are underrepre-
sented and have fewer opportunities in these fields. Chief Justice Burger's dissent stated
that "[slince the Court's opinion relies heavily on its finding that women have tradition-
ally dominated the nursing profession, it suggests that a State might well be justified in
maintaining, for example, the option of an all-women's business school or liberal arts
program." Hogan, 458 U.S. at 733, 102 S. Ct. at 3341 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)(internal
citations omitted).
143. For studies supporting these claims, see supra note 73.
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"women's work") to places that contribute to broadening graduates'
capabilities and dismantling traditional gender roles, helps to illustrate
the contingent, empirical quality of the claim that single-sex schools
for women enhance women's capabilities.144 This component of the
inquiry might also permit courts to examine whether the particular
arrangement at issue fits the more general findings on the benefits of
single-sex education.
The two parts of the inquiry, taken together, position courts to
recognize and assess tradeoffs in the capability-enhancing possibilities
for various educational arrangements. Hogan amply illustrates the need
for courts to have this facility.
2. Single-Sex Educational Option for Both Sexes (Paired Offerings)
Where a government offers single-sex educational opportunities to
both sexes, in the form of "paired offerings," a court should undertake
a version of the inquiry outlined above, except that here there are non-
zero entries on each ledger, with each sex being benefited by the
availability of a single-sex school. Members of each sex may thereby
improve their capability of having an education. Courts' work in this
situation would center on the second part of the inquiry outlined above.
The question would become whether the offerings are equal in terms
of the extent to which they enhance their respective students' capabil-
ities, and whether they address, as need be, women's relative capability
deprivation. A court would need to examine the curriculum, subject
matter, and pedagogy of the program offerings at each school, attending
to both the tangible and intangible benefits provided. In United States
v. Virginia, for example, the Court examined the paired offerings of
VMI and VWIL, undertaking a detailed comparison of the schools'
tangible offerings (e.g., physical plant, library holdings, student-faculty
ratio, etc.), as well as "'those qualities which are incapable of objective
measurement but which make for greatness' in a school, including
'reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position
and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige." 1 45 Of a VMI education, the Court noted that "[t]he school's
alumni overwhelmingly perceive that their VMI training helped them
to realize their personal goals."' 46 The Court observed that VMI's
program is particularly successful at enabling graduates to fill positions
of leadership. 147 Virginia's proffered remedy to the unconstitutional
144. See also Rhode, supra note 73, at 128-45 (discussing historical changes in the
roles of single-sex schools for women and noting that the possible future roles of these
institutions depend in part on the societal position of women and the shape of social
structures at the time).
145. 116 S.Ct. at 2285 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634, 70 S. Ct. 848,
850 (1950)).
146. Id. at 2269.
147. Id.
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exclusion of women from VMI, the newly created all-female VWIL,
could not similarly claim to enhance its graduates' capabilities.
The qualification that the arrangement address women's relative ca-
pability deprivation may in practice make it difficult to construct
permissible paired offerings. The very existence of an institution that
excludes women - at least against a backdrop of sex inequality, such
as persists today - is likely to affirm or exacerbate the current capability
gap between men and women."4 8 This qualification, further, might be
taken to permit or even to require paired schools whose intangible and
tangible offerings are greater for the capability-deprived sex. As a
practical matter, equality seems more likely where both schools are
starting out at the same time to develop a complement of tangible and
intangible benefits for their respective students, whereas Virginia's
belated attempt to cobble together a sister school for VMI in the form
of VWIL produced only a "pale shadow.' '149 In any event, as United
States v. Virginia illustrates, judicial fact-finding needs to be sufficiently
detailed to permit real comparison of tangibles and intangibles.150
Finally, a court would need to ascertain that the single-sex structure
actually worked to improve the capabilities of each sex. This portion
of the inquiry would proceed along the lines outlined in the second
component of the second part above, in cases making single-sex edu-
cational opportunies available only to one sex. Again, the contingency
of the claim that single-sex enducation is beneficial for either men or
women makes this component of the inquiry necessary in the case of
paired offerings as well.
Difficult questions for such a decisional framework, of course, remain.
What, for example, should be viewed as the relevant "package of
educational opportunities"? Under what circumstances may a court
view in isolation a single school within a larger university, as the Court
did in Hogan?1 51 Should a court consider the relevant geographical
148. See generally Rhode, supra note 73; Vojdik, surpa note 73. In addition, if data
that all-male learning environments increase sexist attitudes and behavior in male students
are borne out, then the availability of a single-sex opportunity for men would also
contribute to rather than address women's relative capability deprivation.
149. VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2285.
150. The Court demonstrated this ability in comparing VMI and VWIL. But compare
the Court's efforts in Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Pa., 430 U.S. 703, 97 S. Ct. 1671
(1977), in the context of paired all-boys and all-girls secondary schools, where the Third
Circuit readily found that the educational offerings were "essentially equal" and the
Supreme Court affirmed per curiarn, despite evidence that with respect to academic
reputation, offerings in the sciences, and computer facilities, the all-girls Girls High
School was inferior to the all-boys Central High School. This case was effectively re-
litigated in the state courts in Newburg v. Board of Pub. Educ., 9 Phila. 556 (C.P. Phila.
County 1983), aff'd, 478 A.2d 1352 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), under "higher resolution" of
the sort that is a model for judicial fact-finding in comparison of "separate-but-equal"
cases. See Bennett L. Saferstein, Note, Revisiting Plessy at the Virginia Military Institute:
Reconciling Single-Sex Education with Equal Protection, 54 U. Prrr. L. Rv. 651-52
(1993).
151. To this end, the Court noted that the School of Nursing had its own faculty and
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boundaries to be those of the governing public entity, e.g., the State of
Virginia? Or should it look, too, at barriers or hurdles within such a
system that, as a practical matter, create internal divisions (e.g., the
distance students are required to travel, an issue in Hogan? 1 52 Should
private educational offerings be considered as part of the relevant
"package"? Justice Scalia's dissent in United States v. Virginia assumes
that they should, although the majority apparently disagrees. These
practical considerations bear on, among other things, whether a single-
sex offering will be viewed as available to one sex only or a part of a
"paired offering," a determination that has important implications
under the framework outlined above.
Indeed, under the capability approach as outlined, much of the hard
work is left to the courts for case-by-case resolution. This is appropriate.
But what is provided is important: this approach supplies a concrete,
useful metric - capabilities - by which to evaluate educational ar-
rangements' contribution to sex inequality.
CONCLUSION
Sex inequality is a grave social failure. It is insufferable that women
in the United States, because they are women, are disadvantaged
legally, socially and economically relative to men. The Equal Protection
Clause might contribute to dismantling sex inequality, but the work
that the Court has permitted it to do so far is partial.
A particular problem stems from the Court's preoccupation with
measures that are the product of legislative stereotypes about women.
This focus has sometimes led the Court to invalidate measures that
work to address women's immediate social and economic disadvantage.
Furthermore, this preoccupation with legislative inputs may have re-
sulted in an inquiry that is well-trained to ferret out measures that are
the product of stereotypes, but unequipped to address the remaining
aspects of sex inequality. The inquiry that has resulted is not sufficiently
nuanced to deal with measures' complex implications for women's
lives. The educational context brings this problem to the fore.
Education contributes to human well-being, improving basic life
prospects as well as more complex aspects of what it means to live a
human life. Given current inequalities in well-being, with women being
less well off, access to appropriate, quality education is indispensible
administrative officers and established its own criteria for admissions. Hogan, 458 U.S.
at 720, 104 S. Ct. at 3334. Further, the Court pointed out that the factual underpinnings
of the plaintiff's claim involved only his exclusion from the School of Nursing (despite
the Court of Appeals' broader references to all schools with MUW). Id. at 723, 102 S.
Ct. at 3335 n.7.
152. Cf. Justice Powell's characterization of Joe Hogan's claim as one of convenience,
at most a hurdle, not a barrier. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 735, 102 S. Ct. at 3342 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). One could, however, imagine distance constituting a real barrier to atten-
dance, particularly for low-income students.
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for women. One option for higher education that seems effective for
women is single-sex education.
Single-sex education necessarily entails a sex-based classification.
The Court recently reiterated that sex-based classifications may be
consitutional in some cases. Among these cases, the Court stated that
sex-based classifications are permissible "to advance full development
of the talents and capacities of our Nation's people." The Court's words
here resonate with a conception of equality that assesses advantage by
reference to well-being and to capabilities as a measure of well-being.
I suggest that courts employ a capability approach to assessing higher
educational arrangements that include a single-sex offering. This ap-
proach holds greater promise than the current inquiry for enabling
courts fully to evaluate inequality in this context. A capability approach
improves the Court's inquiry by providing a common, concrete and
substantively useful metric by which to evaluate educational arrange-
ments.

